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Does Resource Commercialization 
Induce Local Conservation?  
A Cautionary Tale From Southwestern Morocco 
 
Abstract: 
Ecotourism, bioprospecting and non-timber product marketing have been promoted 
recently as market-based instruments for environment protection, but without sound 
understanding of the resulting net conservation effects. We present evidence on the local 
conservation effects of recent argan oil commercialization in Morocco, which seems a promising 
case study in conservation through resource commercialization. Our empirical analysis shows, 
however, that resource commercialization is not creating strong net conservation incentives 
because assumptions implicit in the prevailing logic prove incorrect in this case. Generally, the 
experience of southwestern Morocco provides a cautionary tale about the assumed efficacy of 
conservation strategies founded on resource commercialization.  
 
 





I.  Introduction 
The past decade has witnessed widespread experimentation with market-based instruments for 
environment protection, including industrial emissions trading and transferable quotas in 
fisheries in wealthy countries and the promotion of ecotourism, bioprospecting, game cropping 
and non-timber forest product marketing in poorer countries.  Although such efforts appear to 
work well in some settings, a sufficient mass of empirical evidence does not yet exist to permit 
clear determination of the efficacy of such methods in achieving conservation objectives.  This is 
perhaps especially true with respect to tropical forests.  Ever since Peters et al. (1989) showed 
that a tract of rainforest could, under certain conditions, be more valuable if sustainably 
harvested than if logged or converted to pasture, environmentalists have eagerly embraced 
resource commercialization as a conservation strategy. Ecotourism, bioprospecting and the 
marketing of non-timber products have thus been aggressively promoted in recent years, but 
without a sound understanding of the actual net conservation effects of such efforts. This paper 
makes a contribution toward filling that void. 
We present evidence on the local conservation effects of recent argan oil 
commercialization efforts in Morocco. The argan oil case is in part a bioprospecting story.   
European chemists recently discovered that the oil from the nut of the argan tree endemic to the 
dry forests of southwest Morocco exhibits desirable properties for cosmetics sold commercially 
throughout Europe, Israel and around the world.  A dramatic expansion of marketing and 
processing of argan oil, complete with induced institutional and technological change, has 




marketing since argan oil commercialization requires ongoing nut harvesting and processing in 
situ because attempted introductions elsewhere in the world have achieved little success and 
synthetic substitutes have yet to be developed.   
On its surface, the argan oil story seems promising as a case study in conservation 
through resource commercialization.  Relatively poor forest dwellers produce argan oil, hold 
well-established access rights to the forest, and pose the principal threat to the forest via 
livestock browsing.  Locals are therefore well positioned both to reap the rents resulting from an 
increase in the value of forest products that flow from resource conservation and to modify 
behaviors so as to achieve conservation.   Our empirical analysis shows, however, that resource 
commercialization is not creating strong net conservation incentives.  Indeed, the biology of the 
argan tree and the organization of markets for argan products together may cause oil 
commercialization to harm the argan forest in the long run.  As we will show, the prevailing 
logic of conservation through resource commercialization fails because crucial implicit 
assumptions prove incorrect in the case of argan oil.  The experience of southwestern Morocco 
thus provides a cautionary tale about the efficacy of conservation strategies founded on resource 
commercialization.    
 
II.  The Argan Forest 
The argan tree (Argania spinosa (L) Skeels) is endemic to Morocco, where it covers 867,000 
hectares (ha), second in coverage only to the cork oak tree. The argan tree is unique and 
ecologically valuable.  It is the only species of the tropical family Sapotaceae remaining in the 




ecosystem, providing the final barrier against the encroaching deserts (Morton and Voss 1987, 
Mellado 1989, M’Hirit et al. 1998). The argan forest lies primarily within the provinces of 
Agadir, Taroudant, Tiznit, and Essaouira, hereafter termed the Argan Forest Region (AFR). 
Despite this dependence, argan forest cover fell by half during the 20
th century.  A change 
assessment in two communes of the Province of Taroudant indicated a significant drop in 
vegetation cover on 43% of the land area in this region from 1981-87 (Bakkoury 1999). Many 
organizations are now devoting considerable resources to conservation of the AFR. Central to 
these efforts is the commercialization of argan oil, a product extracted from the fruit of the argan 
tree with notable cosmetic, medical and nutritive properties. This has led to a sharp expansion of 
demand for argan oil in non-traditional, urban and overseas markets, on which more in section 
IV.  
Tenurial arrangements in the AFR, composed of customary, legal and Qur’anic elements, 
reflect argan’s importance in Berber society by giving preferential treatment to the collection of 
argan fruit over all other activities (DePonteves 1989, De Ponteves et al. 1990). Ownership of an 
argan tree is separate from grazing rights to the land around the tree, which may be separate from 
ownership of the land on which the tree grows. These rights are further divorced from access to 
argan fruit and wood.  
Clearly established rights dictate both spatial and temporal use of the forest. Spatially, the 
argan forest is unofficially divided
1 into large tracts assigned to villages. These village tracts of 
forest land are subdivided into two categories of usufruct: communal and quasi-private. On the 
communally-managed tracts, called azroug,
2 all rights are held communally by residents of the 




exercise their usufructuary rights, with the exception of cultivation, on a year round basis. Like 
much common property around the world, the azroug is typically quite degraded. Generally a 
village’s azroug is nearby, although households’ dispersion results in differential access to 
azroug resources among households holding identical rights. 
All land in the village's forest tract not designated as azroug, typically a majority of the 
total area of the tract, is subdivided into quasi-private agdal units that are distributed to 
individuals in the village. Possession of an agdal grants an individual exclusive harvest rights to 
the argan fruit, whether in the tree or on the ground in his agdal.  
Customary usufructure arrangements also divide the forest into two distinct periods. 
During the communal grazing period, roughly from mid-September to mid-May, AFR 
households communally exercise their usufructuary rights and are free to do so on their own 
private land or on the state forest tract assigned to their village, regardless of whether the land 
has been designated as azroug or agdal. Then, around mid-May or early June, regional appointed 
officials formally open the agdal season,
3 or fruit harvest, at which point individuals
4 begin to 
exercise exclusive harvest rights within the bounds of their agdals. A household is free during 
the agdal season
5 to exclude others, including their neighbors within the village, from their agdal 
by constructing a temporary enclosure around their assigned trees. Only the azroug remains open 
for communal grazing during this season and a household must graze or browse their livestock 
either on their own agdal or on the azroug, which is understandably more crowded during the 
agdal season. This seasonal crowding contributes significantly to forest degradation in the 
azroug. The temporal and spatial dimensions of the argan forest tenure system are characterized 




Today, the greatest threats to the argan forest are due to the intensification of livestock 
browsing and grazing and the expansion of urban and rural settlements. Livestock numbers have 
increased substantially (Lybbert 2000) and obvious signs of overgrazing and overbrowsing are 
everywhere in the argan forest. Browsing directly harms the existing, mature argan trees as goats 
will climb high into the branches of an argan tree to reach its fruit. Though less common, camel 
herds also browse in the argan forest, leaving an easily identified trail of broken branches in their 
wake. Overgrazing can cause soil erosion, affect the microclimate of the forest by reducing 
ground cover and humidity and increasing temperature, and impede the long term regeneration of 
the forest. 
    
III.  The Logic of Conservation Through Resource Commercialization 
With the biological and institutional details of the argan forest in mind, we turn now to the 
question at the core of this paper: does resource commercialization necessarily induce increased 
local conservation? The logic of conservation through resource commercialization is clear and 
compelling on its surface.  The gross present value of conserving the underlying resource, R, is 
just the discounted stream of benefits produced from sustainable harvest, 
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where pb is the price of the biological product, D is the discount factor (equal to 1/(1+r), where r 
is the discount rate) and Bt is the period-specific physical flow of product from the resource, in 




commercialization aims to increase demand for the biological product, thereby increasing pB and, 
thus, locals’ valuation of the underlying biota.  The gross present value of the resource is 
obviously unit elastic in product price; for every one percent increase in the price of a harvested 
product, the underlying resource value likewise grows by one percent.  Doubling or tripling of 
resource prices, as has occurred in the argan oil case, is thus expected to make natural capital an 
attractive investment for local resource owners, inducing conservation of existing forest and even 
planting of new trees.  This logic permeates most arguments for resource commercialization as a 
conservation strategy. 
At least five important assumptions underpin this tidy logic.  First, it is assumed that 
resource owners capture the present value of resource production. This requires that 
commercialization increases the price received by the resource owner. While this may occur on 
average in a region, as we demonstrate later, the organization of product marketing may exclude 
important subpopulations of resource owners, in which case the process may end before it can 
ever begin in the areas they control because they don’t sell the product or don’t get a higher unit 
value post-commercialization.  This assumption also requires a modicum of tenure security. As 
tenure becomes less secure, resource owners’ expected future harvest, along with R, decreases.  
Second, so long as time preferences cause people to discount the future, the biology of the 
resource, as manifest in the production sequence Bt, dictates the magnitude of the increase in 
resource value. Unit elasticity refers to the proportionality of the increase in value.  But if 
resource product does not arrive for many years, as is the case with some slow-growing species 
such as argan trees, then even a tripling of value yields only meager absolute gains because the 
base period resource value is so low.  The implicit assumption is that those increased absolute 




true.  Third, the simple model above assumes that Bt is exogenous to individuals’ harvest 
decisions.  If one allows for a slightly more sophisticated specification of the population 
dynamics of the resource, then over-harvesting of B can affect the resource’s recruitment rate.  
Put more simply, if people harvest more of an increasingly valuable natural product that is also 
essential to regeneration of the resource, as is the case for nuts, then even a protected forest may 
collapse in time. Fourth, the increased wealth that results from increased prices and resource 
values may induce either tenurial change or investment in other assets that threaten the target 
resource.  Fifth and finally, it is commonly assumed that local social and cultural conditions are 
such that locals respond to economic incentives by either making conservation investments in the 
resource or by altering behavior that directly or incidentally harms the resources. The sections 
that follow explore these five assumptions in turn. 
  Throughout the remainder of the paper we exploit data collected during extensive 
fieldwork in the AFR, including a household (HH) survey in the Smimou Caidat, a county-like 
administrative unit located in the Essaouira Province in southwest Morocco. Villages  were 
stratified by forest density (low, average and high), then two villages randomly selected from 
each stratum.
6 HHs within selected villages were stratified according to the number of agdal 
rights held and then randomly selected from each agdal wealth category.  The survey was fielded 
separately with the male and female heads of 117 HHs.
7 
    
IV.  Commercialization of Argan Oil: Are locals capturing the full value of their trees? 
The indigenous Berber tribes of the AFR have relied for centuries on argan oil as a key element 




agent for minor wounds and a treatment for everything from rashes to diabetes. Yet not until 
perhaps 20 years ago were technical analyses performed on the oil to determine the veracity of 
these traditional Berber claims. Although these western-style scientific investigations have not 
been able to validate every claim, the studies consistently provide evidence in support of a 
number of argan oil virtues. This has sparked entrepreneurial activity by those who foresee 
lucrative non-traditional markets for this exotic oil and the nutritive, dermatological and even 
medicinal properties it seems to possess.
 8   
In the push to understand the properties of argan oil more fully and to find a market for 
the oil, European cosmetic companies were perhaps the most keen and agile of the investigators. 
In the early 1990s these companies began adding small amounts of argan oil to their moisturizer 
products. By 1995, at least three cosmetic companies were using argan oil in their products, 
namely Galénique (product: Argane), Yves Rocher (product: Acaciane) and Colgate Palmolive 
(product: dermatological soap, Antinéa') (Charrouf 1995). Commercial argan oil distributors are 
also interested in tapping the high-value, domestic argan oil demand of tourists and middle and 
upper class urban-dwelling Moroccans. Today, the two most common argan oil products are 
edible oil, marketed as a cooking or salad oil, and cosmetic oil, marketed as a moisturizer and a 
treatment for wrinkles and a variety of dermatological ailments (e.g., acne, abrasions, rashes).  
Most of the current export is to Europe and Israel.
9 In Israel, home to some 600,000 
Moroccan immigrants, imported argan oil is sold for up to $35 per liter (Enneking 1998). While 
precise figures indicating the change in and current level of exports are unavailable or 
incomplete and unreliable, GTZ, the German aid organization that sponsors the largest network 
of argan oil cooperatives in the AFR, exported over 2,000 liters of argan oil in the first six 
months of 1999 and indicates that it is difficult to keep up with demand at times.




These exporters quickly recognized, however, that traditional argan oil extraction and 
marketing were ill-suited to higher value markets. Consumers in these new, higher-price markets 
expect a higher degree of purity and higher quality oil and packaging than traditional argan oil 
consumers. Thus, argan oil could not simply be purchased at souk from local producers and 
resold for a premium in other markets. More sterile, mechanized extraction and more 
sophisticated marketing strategies were needed.  This evolution in processing and marketing has 
meant that locals participate in emerging argan markets mainly by supplying argan fruit.
11  
Since argan fruit supply is inelastic in the short run, increased demand in argan fruit 
markets has resulted in higher fruit prices for locals, doubling from around 0.5DH/kg in the mid-
1990s to over 1DH/kg. However, AFR locals have not uniformly benefited from increasing 
argan fruit prices. Even with the higher prices argan fruit has a low value-to-weight ratio, making 
long distance transport to market unprofitable. The argan fruit middlemen who have emerged to 
supply the needs of the growing market transport the fruit in lorries and therefore stick to 
markets that are easily accessible with good roads. Thus, locals in low density forest areas, which 
tend to be closer to roads and larger markets and are therefore more accessible, tend to have far 
greater access to argan fruit markets than their high density forest counterparts.
12 
  The first assumption implicit in the commercialization-conservation logic also requires 
some degree of tenure security. As discussed previously, the tenure system of the AFR is 
seasonal. During the off-agdal season, locals theoretically cannot exclude others from using their 
agdal tracts. Nonetheless, the increased value of mature trees has given rise to a recent enclosure 
movement in which locals are constructing permanent barriers around their agdals. We discuss 




The distribution of rights in the forest does not rely on official titling procedures. Instead, 
locals often publicly establish and maintain their rights by cultivating barley in their agdals. 
Unfortunately, continual cropping of barley without significant fertilizer amendments can 
quickly deplete key nutrients in the soil, especially areas with an arid climate and already poor 
soil. Barley cultivation thus threatens the sustainability of the argan forest directly by impeding 
the natural regeneration process and indirectly by leaching soil nutrients. Furthermore, the desire 
to establish greater security over one’s agdal via barley cropping intensifies as the value of argan 
fruit increases.  
Finally, locals’ tenure insecurity is illustrated by the periodic migration of massive 
Saharan camel and goat herds into the AFR.
13 During the summer of 1999, which followed a 
year of below average precipitation, a herd of over 7,000 camels, owned by an evidently wealthy 
pastoralist from the disputed Western Sahara, slowly trekked through the forest south of 
Essaouira, wreaking havoc to the forest during the agdal season. The accompanying camel 
herders completely disregarded the agdal rights of the local villagers and adamantly defended 
their right to the relatively abundant fodder. 
  In summary, locals in the AFR are unlikely to capture the full value of the argan oil 
commercialization because (1) they are not reaping the full increase in price due to market entry 
barriers that relegate them to fruit supplier status or leave them out of the market altogether and 
(2) their expected harvest is less than the expected production of the tree due to tenure insecurity. 
Furthermore, attempts to increase tenure security through barley cultivation may have negative 
implications on forest sustainability. As we discuss in the next section, the enclosure movement 




V.  Biology Matters 
This section explores in greater analytical detail the positive direct effect of increased argan oil 
prices on the present value of argan trees and, derivatively, on conservation behaviors such as 
reforestation and protection from overgrazing. First we estimate a yield function for the tree and 
then incorporate discount rates and fruit prices to estimate the present value of argan trees. For 
most domesticated trees, such an activity would be very straightforward since the relationship 
between the age of a tree and its productivity is generally well understood. In the case of the 
argan tree, however, this relationship is more elusive because the tree has a unique mechanism 
for coping with frequent droughts. During unusually dry years, the argan tree goes dormant, 
stores its needed reserves deep in its root system and produces neither fruit nor foliage (Bani 
Aameur, Louali, and Dupuis 1998). Then, once there is sufficient precipitation, the trees begin 
producing again. Because does not produce rings during dormant periods, there is no reliable 
record of an argan tree’s age and argan’s fruit yield-age relationship has yet to be explicitly 
researched.  A few argan researchers have made passing comments about the productivity of 
the tree (Table 1). Unfortunately, not a single reference links observed fruit production with a 
precise age of the tree. Nonetheless, these data provide information enough to estimate a crude 
argan fruit production function, assuming an exponential yield function 
t b a e t Q
- = ) ( , where t is 
measured in years with t=0 representing the germination year, Q(t) is the production in year t 
measured in kilograms of dried fruit, and a and b are estimable parameters. The present value of 
an argan tree’s fruit production (R) in discrete time is thus  
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where p is the price of argan fruit in DH per kilogram, r is the discount factor.
14 We fix the time 
horizon at 100 years since discounting effectively extinguishes the value of gains beyond this 
horizon.  
  Because some of the estimates in Table 1 conflict and because fruit production depends 
on precipitation and is therefore highly variable both temporally and spatially, we estimate two 
candidate yield functions, Y1 and Y2. Both use the specification above, but estimate the 
parameters a and b using different references from Table 1. The first yield function (Y1) borrows 
DePonteves’ (1989) estimate that the argan tree’s maximum fruit production is 100kg, which we 
assume occurs at t=200, the oft-cited age of maturity (M’Hirit et al. 1999). Additionally, Y1 
assumes the upper bound on the range of average production in Table 1 occurs at t=60. These 
point estimates yield a=5.3 and b=138. The second candidate yield function (Y2) assumes 
maximum annual fruit production of 45kg/tree (Zahidi 1997) at t=140 (Koubby 1997)and 
average annual production of 15kg at t=40 (Rahali 1989). This calibratrion yields estimates of 
a=4.3 and b=61.5.  
The production profiles of Y1 and Y2 are shown in Figure 2. The gross present value of 
the annual fruit harvest is shown graphically in Figure 3.
 15  These present values assume p=1, 
roughly the current price per kilogram of dry fruit.
16 What is most striking about Figure 2 is that 
because the tree is slow growing and discounting takes its toll on the returns to fruit harvested far 
into the future, the maximum present value of annual fruit production is extremely low, about 
1DH and 2DH for Y1 and Y2, respectively.  Summing these annual present values across 
t=0,…,100 yields an RY1 of only approximately 60DH at germination. RY2 is 108DH, larger than 
RY1, but still rather small. By way of comparison, the average daily wage for a male laborer is 




These low gross present values perhaps explain why spontaneous local reforestation has yet to 
occur. Locals have an incentive to plant only if the expected net present value is positive, that is, 
if the gross present value of a newly planted tree times the probability of the sapling surviving 
(i.e., the probability of actually reaping R), less any non-labor costs and any risk premium 
(associated with aversion to income risk) exceeds the (opportunity) cost of labor dedicated to 
planting and tending. Even if the Service des Eaux et Forets donates argan seedlings to locals 
free of charge, two or three days’ labor planting and tending the tree makes it unremunerative, 
especially since the reforestation success rate is low as most plantings fail. In short, the low net 
expected present value of fruit production at germination is generally too small to make planting 
argan trees pay, even after a doubling of fruit prices in the wake of commercialization.
17  Survey 
evidence corroborates the qualitative finding of the preceding estimates. The survey asked both 
male and female HH heads, “If you were given a tree to plant on your property, what kind of tree 
would you prefer?” Olive trees were overwhelmingly most desired (Table 2). High density forest 
villages are practically the only ones in which any HH heads identified argan trees as their 
preferred species, indicating that these HHs’ relative valuation of the argan tree is marginally 
higher than that of mid- and low density forest HHs in spite of lower relative scarcity and less 
marketing of argan fruit in the high density forest. This relative preference for argan trees among 
high density forest HHs is also likely due to the fact that tree productivity and forest density tend 
to be positively correlated, so trees’ present value is likely higher in the high-density zones.  
Male HH heads prefer the carob tree to argan in each region. Administrators at the 
Essaouira regional office of the Service des Eaux et Forets confirmed that carob seedlings are 
consistently in higher demand than argan seedlings because they more quickly produce 




substantial local market for carob fruit. Female HH heads in high density villages were more 
likely to prefer the argan tree than males, although they too uniformly prefer olive trees and none 
has actually planted or watered argan trees. In sum, spontaneous local reforestation is unlikely to 
follow directly from high argan fruit prices due to the tree’s slow-growing biology.  
The next logical question is whether commercialization induces better protection of 
existing trees.   To answer this, we begin by estimating the present value of an existing argan 
tree’s fruit production by shifting the time horizon in equation (2) forward from t=0,…,100 to 
t=(t+1),…,(t+100), where t is in the age of the existing tree in years. The gross present value of 
fruit production now becomes  
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where i=1,2. RY1:0 is thus identical to our previous calculations of RY1 at t=0 while RY1:60  is the 
gross present value of fruit production for a tree of age 60 years.  
Figure 4 shows the present value of annual fruit production for t=60.  The profiles of Y1 
and Y2 are very similar, with maximum annual present value of 20-25DH, as opposed to 1-2DH 
in the t=0 case. RY1:60 is 695DH, and RY2:60 is 626DH, as much as an order of magnitude greater 
than RY1:0 and RY2:0.  Table 3 shows how valuation changes depending on the initial age of the 
tree, underscoring that the conservation effects of resource commercialization apply to existing, 
mature forest but not to reforestation in this case. 
The relative magnitude of RYi:60 helps explain the considerable value assigned to an agdal 




of argan fruit adds an estimated DH300-350 to the value of a mature tree that is already 
established, for which the risk of failure is much lower than at germination.  This increase is 
equivalent to one to two weeks’ earnings on the local labor market, easily enough to induce AFR 
residents to devote an extra couple of days’ time to building fences. Generally, AFR locals 
appear willing to invest time and effort in enclosing their existing trees with permanent agdal 
barriers although they seem unwilling to invest time and effort in planting even free argan 
seedlings. Note, however, that for relatively impatient individuals (with relatively high implicit 
discount rates) even the value of an existing tree might not justify the extra effort required to 
protect it. 
Once again, survey evidence corroborates the implications of these estimates.  Male HH 
heads were asked whether they would cut down the argan trees on their property for either 
agricultural conversion or for the value of the wood if the Service des Eaux et Forets gave them 
permission. The majority responded that they would not cut their argan trees for either purpose, 
although the pressure to convert forest to agriculture appears significantly greater in low density 
villages (Table 2). Where a decade ago there was significant clearing of forest for fuelwood and 
agriculture in the AFR, in the wake of argan oil commercialization and resulting fruit price 
increases, the argan forest appears less threatened by direct conversion or clear-cutting. Rather, 
the key to conserving the argan forest now lies in addressing local threats such as overbrowsing. 
We asked female HH heads, first, how frequently they allowed their goats to climb and 
browse in argan trees and, second, to assess whether overgrazing and/or overbrowsing were 
problems in the argan forest. To the first question, nearly all (95%) browsed their goats in argan 
trees frequently, which likely reflects the widespread perception that livestock are the most 




Responses to the second, overgrazing question were more instructive. In the high density forest 
villages, where trees are plentiful and the commercial benefits of argan fruit marketing have 
remain largely unchanged in the wake of commercialization, women do not perceive overgrazing 
to be a problem (Table 2).  By contrast, roughly half the respondents thought overgrazing is a 
problem in the low and middle density regions, where the price increases due to 
commercialization have been significant. 
Key informants report that increased argan fruit prices have indeed induced more forest-
friendly browsing practices. The Caid (regional appointed authority) of Tamanar observed that 
since the arrival of the argan oil cooperative, locals are hesitant to allow their goats to browse in 
argan trees because they know that every piece of argan fruit their goats digest is one they could 
have sold to the cooperative. Other interviewees made similar observations regarding areas 
where fruit markets were accessible to collectors. 
Even if households are not keeping their own goats out of their agdal trees, an enclosure 
movement has emerged to keep others out of one’s trees.  As fruit becomes more valuable and 
agdal holders become more protective of their fruit (or enclose their agdal tracts outright), what 
was previously communal forest land during the off-agdal season is effectively removed from 
the common pool resources. This de facto change in tenurial arrangements, though controversial, 
is increasingly common and appears to be gaining acceptance.  
Increased protection of agdal forest is likely to cause greater degradation in azroug forest 
in so far as it displaces livestock from the former areas to the latter.  The likelihood of locals’ 
making efforts to protect azroug trees is low for two reasons.  First, common property 




agdal trees, so the present value of their fruit production is less. Second and relatedly, there are 
few if any traditional cooperative maintenance and management arrangements in the AFR, so 
azroug trees fall prey to classic commons problems: everyone has an incentive to exploit the tree 
but no one has an incentive to conserve it.  Although the poorest HHs, who have relatively few 
or no agdal rights, would be most harmed by such an intensification of competition over and 
exploitation of common property resources, even those with plenty of agdal rights have an 
incentive to browse their herds more intensely in the azroug as the value of their agdal’s fruit 
production increases. It therefore seems that at least in the short-run, azroug trees will probably 
be degraded yet further as argan fruit prices increase because of displaced off-agdal season 
grazing, resulting from induced agdal enclosure. 
In summary, the biology of the argan tree makes the present value of a newly planted tree 
low, so even a strong proportional increase in fruit prices has too modest an absolute effect on 
tree values to induce reforestation.  Mature trees prove worth conserving, however, and the 
survey evidence appears to bear this out indirectly.  More men declare no interest in converting 
argan forest and more women recognize livestock overgrazing to pose a serious threat to the 
forest.  Moreover, an enclosure movement has begun  in which people are undertaking costly 
investments in permanent barriers to exclude neighbors from traditional off-season access to 
agdal trees.  The net conservation effect on the azroug regions to which livestock are being 
displaced now is almost surely negative, while the net effect in the agdal areas appears positive 






VI.  Harvest Decisions and Productivity 
Reforestation in the case of the argan tree is a very difficult proposition. The extensive root 
system of the argan seedling, which extends deep into the soil at a remarkably young age, makes 
transplanting difficult and rarely successful. There is also evidence that argan seedlings are 
extremely vulnerable to various fungi (Bani Aameur 1997). Whatever the explanation, argan 
reforestation projects are plagued with exceptionally low success rates. In one well-organized 
experimental reforestation effort, only 11% of the argan seedlings planted survived for more than 
three months (Alaoui 1997). Since no appreciable human reforestation is currently taking place 
or is likely to be successful in coming years, the future of the argan forest depends entirely on 
natural regeneration, which requires that at least some fruit remains uncollected. Increasing fruit 
prices could negatively and directly affect the forest by making fruit too valuable to leave 
behind. 
Some researchers worry that the long term sustainability of the argan forest has already 
been jeopardized by nearly complete fruit harvests in recent years (Bani Aameur 1997). 
Moreover, some claim that the microclimatic conditions have changed sufficiently as a result of 
thinning canopies (less shade) and overgrazing (less organic litter on the forest floor) as to 
seriously hamper the natural regeneration process (Zahidi and Bani Aameur 1996).  
Our survey solicited local perceptions of this prospective overharvesting and regeneration 
problem.  Table 4 reports that the proportion of female HH heads who believe all the argan fruit 
in the forest is collected is decreasing in forest density, with more than half the HHs in low 




fruit is scarce and collectors have good access to markets now returning higher prices, few if any 
fruit are left to seed forest renewal.   
In the short run, decisions about how to harvest are just as important to forest 
productivity as decisions about how much to harvest. Traditionally, locals harvested fruit from 
argan trees either by sending goats into the tree to browse on the fruit and later collecting the 
valuable stone in the goat manure or by waiting for the fruit to fall from the tree. As the fruit 
becomes more valuable, however, there is some anecdotal evidence that locals turn to more 
aggressive techniques, such as knocking fruit from the tree using sticks and stones. More 
aggressive harvesting methods, seemingly more common in areas with relatively weak tenure 
security, can damage trees and hurt natural forest regeneration. 
 
VI.  Indirect Effects: Investment and Tenure Change 
The indirect effects due to commercialization-induced increases in local wealth are somewhat 
more difficult to assess.  Livestock are the most desired form of household wealth in the AFR, 
where non-farm options are scant and crop cultivation offers poor returns. Consequently, at least 
some of the proceeds from argan fruit sales will likely be invested in livestock.
18  Since stocking 







VII.  Cultural and Social Considerations 
It is important to recognize as well the cultural context of the argan forest. There exist two 
competing argan tree legends. The first traces the tree’s origin to the prophet Mohammed, who 
was given stewardship over the tree by Allah and told to plant it liberally throughout 
southwestern Morocco. In this narrative, Mohammed is responsible for the providence of the 
argan tree along with all its bountiful uses. In direct opposition stands the second legend, which 
traces argan to Satan, who was permitted to use the tree to afflict and torment the Berber people 
(more specifically, the Berber women). Women ascribing to the second narrative explain that the 
tree is thorny and demands so much of their time that it distracts them from their other 
responsibilities; only Satan could be responsible for such a pestilence, they say. Most 
importantly, neither of these myths places ultimate responsibility for the argan tree with the 
locals.  
Locals consider the argan tree ‘wild’, and seem to have never invested much time or 
effort in tending argan trees. In contrast, domesticated olive and carob trees do capture the 
locals’ attention and investment. Understanding this perception of the argan tree is fundamental 
to the commercialization-conservation link.  The Berbers routine denial of responsibility for 
argan trees diminishes the likelihood of direct individual investment in the argan tree. This 
cultural context may well evolve, but even if all four previous assumptions held, at least in the 
short run there are reasons to expect AFR locals’ argan conservation behaviors not to respond 






VIII.  Conclusion 
In this paper we assess the net local conservation effect of resource commercialization in the 
case of Morocco’s argan oil. There are at least five important assumptions implicit in the 
standard logic to market-based approaches to conservation.. The ability of resource 
commercialization, whether via ecotourism, bioprospecting, or commercialization of non-timber 
forest products, to translate into appreciable net local conservation hinges critically on these 
underlying assumptions.  
  In the argan oil case, these assumptions are tenuous. Locals are not capturing the full 
value of the more valuable argan oil due to market barriers and tenure insecurity. Nevertheless, 
the development of high-value, non-traditional argan oil markets seems to have succeeded in 
increasing argan fruit prices and, derivatively, locals’ valuation of the argan forest, as evident in 
the agdal enclosure movement. But it is unclear that local conservation is the logical 
consequence of this greater valuation. While agdal enclosure bodes well for the preservation of 
part of the argan forest, displaced exploitation and the incentives associated with local forest 
tenure seem to contribute to localized degradation in azroug forest.  
Harvest decisions are not exogenous to the productivity of the argan tree. Specifically, 
the forest relies almost entirely on natural regeneration since reforestation efforts have largely 
failed. Unfortunately, overharvesting already threatens natural forest regeneration and could 
intensify as fruit prices increase. More aggressive harvesting techniques, if broadly adopted, 
could also threaten the short run productivity of the forest. 
Even with recent fruit price increases, reforestation does not appear to pay because of the 




quite well. This helps explain why locals are largely uninterested in planting argan trees, but are 
willing to invest in protecting their existing trees with permanent enclosures.  
The indirect effects of AFR residents’ investment of any gains from argan oil 
commercialization in livestock pose a serious threat to the forest. Induced tenure change is 
apparent in the argan forest. While this trend bodes well for parts of the forest, localized 
degradation due to displaced exploitation as well as illegal use complicate the assessment of the 
net conservation effect.  
Locals traditionally take little responsibility, culturally or economically, for argan trees 
and so spend little or no effort tending them. While locals clearly recognize their reliance on the 
tree and are hence not inclined to deforest directly, they also perceive the tree as wild and are 
therefore not inclined to reforest either.  
The argan oil case presents a promising case study for analyzing the conservation effect 
of resource commercialization because locals produce argan oil, possess well-established (if not 
always secure) rights to the forest and pose the primary threat to the forest. That critical implicit 
assumptions fail to hold in this case is evidence of the high standard imposed by these 
assumptions. The case of argan oil commercialization in southwestern Morocco thus serves as a 
cautionary tale about the challenge of using market-based efforts to induce local conservation in 
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1 No official records exist that delimit precisely these demarcations, although local authorities are well 
aware of the traditional demarcation of each village’s tract of forest land. 
2This is the term in Tashil’haite, the Berber dialect. In Moroccan Arabic, the term mouchaa is used. 
3 Agdal (literally, "forbidden") is used to refer to both the fruit-bearing season and to the physical cluster of 
trees for which usufrutuary harvest rights are granted to a particular individual. For clarification, ‘agdal 
season’ will refer hereafter to the fruit-bearing season while ‘agdal’ will refer to the cluster of trees 
assigned to an individual.  
4 Strictly speaking, while agdal rights are technically assigned to individuals, generally these rights are 
actually exercised by households, rather than by individuals. 
5 The length of agdal is determined by regional appointed officials, who also are responsible for resolving 
user conflicts in the forest, and varies according to level of precipitation and the resulting productivity of 
the forest. During extraordinarily dry years, which cause the tree to shed its foliage and temporarily curtail 
fruit production, the agdal season may be foregone altogether. 
6 To sort villages in the Smimou Caidat into low, average and high argan forest density, we consulted 
local and regional forestry officials in conjunction with topographical maps and a 1996 forest inventory.  
7 Sampling proportions across villages ranged from 23-34% and have been corrected for in all aggregate 
statistics reported here. 
8 Markets for argan oil did exist historically in local souks. The non-traditional markets being sought 
presently include upscale markets in Moroccan cities targeting both Moroccans and tourists, as well as 
international markets for exotic oils. 
9 Small samples of argan oil are shipped occasionally to the US, Canada or Japan and at least one of the 
firms involved is actively seeking to establish distribution channels in the US (see www.arganoil.com). 
10 Per interview with Mr. Slimane Aziki, one of the cooperative project managers at GTZ. 
11 Traditionally, locals commonly fed whole argan fruit to their livestock, primarily goats, and then 
harvested the argan stones from the manure. These stones were then cracked to remove the oil-rich nut 
which was then crushed to extract the oil. Emerging high-value producers, concerned about the possibility 
of residual impurities from goat ingestion, are therefore only willing to purchase whole argan fruit from 
locals. The attached pulp is essentially a guarantee that the fruit has not been ingested by livestock. For 
more on various signaling mechanisms to resolve asymmetric information in argan product markets see 
Lybbert (2000). 
  In addition, locals face severe infrastructure and credit constraints, which preclude most locals 
from participating directly in the emerging markets via mechanized extraction. 
12 Our survey data show that while high density forest households sold twice as much argan oil at souk 
than mid- or low density forest households, not a single high density household sold argan fruit. In 
contrast, many households in mid- and low density forest regularly sold argan fruit. 
13 These massive and destructive migrations have both a climatological and a political explanation. 
Climatologically, these livestock owners were bringing their herds north in response to the paucity of 
fodder in the Western Sahara, the result of an unusually dry winter and spring. The migrations were 
ignored because of the political conflict surrounding the Western Sahara. No local official dared impede 
them for fear of instigating what could quickly escalate to national crisis. 




= r r  where r is the discount rate.  We initially assume r=0.05.  
Prevailing inflation and nominal interest rates in rural Morocco over the past few years have averaged 4% 
and 9%, respectively. 
15 These gross present values represent an upper bound estimate of the annual returns to planting an 
argan tree since the costs of harvest are not included in the computation. 
16 This price is nearly double the historical average thanks to recent commercialization and mechanization 
efforts. 
17 As these production functions are crude estimations, it is also helpful to analyze the elasticity of RYi:0 
and R Yi:60 with respect to the estimated production points Qmax, Q(60) and Q(40), and the discount rate, 
r. All four Qmax arc elasticities are inelastic, indicating that our crude present value estimates are only 




                                                                                                                                                             
are especially sensitive to the assumed annual production at these midpoints since these midpoints affect 
the shape of the production profile early in the time horizon when the value of production is least 
discounted. Finally, the elasticities of RYi:0 and RYi:60 with respect to the discount rate, r, illustrate how 
extremely sensitive the estimated present value of fruit production is to discounting. The values of these 
elasticities are available upon request. 
18 While some of the proceeds might conceivably be invested in additional agdals of argan trees, the 
market for these assets has historically been quite illiquid. 
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Figure 3 Gross PV at t=0 of annual fruit production for Y1 and Y2 (based on 
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Figure 4 Gross PV at t=60 of annual fruit production for Y1 and Y2 (based on 
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Reference t (years)  Q(t) (kg/tree)
Rahali (1989) Average 15
DePonteves (1989), Mhirit (1999) Average 8-20
DePonteves (1989) Maximum 100
Zahidi (1997) Sample 3-45
Boudy (1950), DePonteves (1989) 5 Begins fruit production
Koubby (1997) 60 Production levels off
140 Production begins to fall




Sample High Mid- Low
    Male Head Carob 11% 21% 5% 5%
Argan  3% 7% - -
Olive 82% 69% 92% 84%
    Female Head Carob 7% 10% 5% 5%
Argan  9% 24% 3% -
Olive 67% 52% 68% 81%
...facilitate agriculture? Yes 10% 2% 8% 22%
No 88% 98% 84% 78%
...procure wood? Yes 8% 7% 13% 3%
No 91% 93% 79% 97%
Agree 62% 83% 45% 54%
Disagree  32% 12% 45% 41%
N= 116 42 38 37
a Carob, argan and olive were the three most frequently cited species. Other species were also cited, but are 
not included here. Elsewhere non-response is responsible for question percentages totaling less than 100%.
"Overgrazing is not a problem in the forest."
"If given a tree to plant, what kind would you prefer?"
a
"If permitted, would you cut your argan trees to…"
Density Categories
















Table 3 Gross PVt for t=(t+1),…,(t+100) (t and t in years, p=1, r=0.05, RYi:t in 




Table 4. Household perceptions of harvest completeness 
Sample High Mid- Low
Strongly Agree 36% 21% 32% 57%
Agree 2% 2% 3% -
Indifferent 11% 24% 8% -
Disagree  16% 24% 16% 8%
Strongly Disagree 34% 29% 39% 35%
* Percentages represent the female HH heads' categorical responses to this statement 






Table A-1 Arc elasticities of PV calculations with respect to (w.r.t.) estimated 
production points and discount rate 
w.r.t. RY1:0 RY1:60 RY2:0 RY2:60
Qmax -0.30 0.25 -0.15 0.48
Q(60) 1.30 0.70
Q(40) 1.22 0.50
r -2.20 -1.10 -1.82 -0.97
Elasticity of 